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Weighing Macedonia’s Entry into NATO
Scott N. Siegel
The eastward enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization contin-
ues unabated. In 2009 the alliance welcomed Croatia and Albania into the 
fold. Discussions over possible membership continue with the Republic of 
Georgia and Ukraine. Current NATO policy is also in favor of Montenegro’s 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina’s joining some day. However, recent international 
events and continued shortcomings in these countries’ domestic political 
institutions preclude entry any time soon. In contrast, the Former Yugosla-
via Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) ranks high among the countries that 
have supposedly made the most significant progress in the reforms neces-
sary to secure membership. If the Greek government had not vetoed inclusion 
of FYROM in the latest round of expansion with the rest of the Adriatic-3 
(FYROM with Croatia and Albania), NATO would most likely have admitted 
it in January 2009 as its twenty-ninth member.
Although not a member yet, the government in Skopje has already contrib-
uted its armed forces and other resources to the alliance’s international mis-
sions. In turn, the NATO alliance has directed significant amounts of aid and 
attention to reforming Macedonia’s political and economic institutions. But 
an overall review of the process so far shows that neither NATO nor FYROM 
has enjoyed the benefits of the latter’s possible membership. They are also 
unlikely to materialize in the near or medium term.
FYROM’s decade-long journey toward NATO membership serves as a good 
case study for evaluating whether NATO expansion should continue. Since 
NATO’s first expansion eastward to include Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
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and Poland, the debate over expanding NATO further has abated signifi-
cantly in the past few years. For example, there is little discussion whether 
expansion advances NATO’s key purpose, that is, to provide collective secu-
rity for its members. Instead of defending its members from possible attack 
by conventional forces, chiefly from an attack by the then–Soviet Union, 
NATO has been “transformed” into an institution responsible for providing 
broadly defined security to its members.1 This includes destroying terror-
ist networks, intervening militarily in failed states and rebuilding them, and 
combating international piracy. I argue that little evidence exists to show that 
Macedonia’s participation in these missions significantly affects the success 
of NATO’s missions or will do so in the future. Given the small size of its 
military and limited resources, FYROM’s participation in Afghanistan, Iraq 
(a non-NATO mission), and in other areas fails to show that its membership 
in NATO would be a substantial boon to the alliance. 
FYROM does benefit from NATO involvement to some extent by obtaining 
NATO’s assistance in solving its own domestic civil conflicts and by deter-
ring possible aggression from its neighbors. It also signifies that FYROM 
has either returned to or joined “Europe,” broadly defined. But even those 
gains should not be overestimated compared to ongoing disputes that are 
stalling that process. For example, the long-running dispute with Greece over 
FYROM’s name and the subsequent veto of its membership application illus-
trates NATO’s inability to solve one, if not the key, interstate dispute between 
Skopje and one of its neighbors. 
In brief, my findings show that FYROM’s membership in NATO will 
generate few tangible benefits for the alliance given the contributions it has 
made so far. Its membership is actually likely to produce more rather than 
fewer security risks for both the alliance and FYROM. Including it in the 
alliance also has not produced what some anticipated would be the bene-
ficial side effects, namely, strengthening the country’s nascent democratic 
and free market institutions. Whatever improvements have been made to its 
democratic institutions cannot be directly attributed to the process of join-
1. David S. Yost, NATO Transformed (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 
1999). 
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ing NATO. The economic gains that should have theoretically ensued from 
NATO membership have not materialized.
NATO expansion to the east and south is proceeding without seemingly 
any attention to these issues. Major opposition from either NATO member 
states or their publics, or from within the candidate countries themselves, has 
not emerged. The lack of debate over continued expansion also shows that 
governments, both among current members and in Skopje, are ignoring the 
possible negative security consequences for the candidate states themselves. 
In this essay I seek to reopen the debate over current and future plans to 
expand NATO by examining the candidacy of Macedonia, the country that is 
most likely next in line to join.
What’s in It for NATO?
The future of the newly independent FYROM was uncertain after it seceded 
from Yugoslavia in 1991. Unlike several other states in the Balkans, it was 
never an independent country. As a result, the rights and protections afforded 
a newly sovereign state under international law were comparatively fragile. 
The country also faced a rather inhospitable security environment along all 
of its borders. The former Yugoslavia and FYROM had serious disputes over 
their international borders, and the Serbian as well as Bulgarian Orthodox 
churches refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Macedonian Ortho-
dox Church and allow it its own archbishopric. Bulgaria continues to deny 
Macedonia’s claims that Macedonian is a distinct language from Bulgarian.2 
Greece also refused to recognize Macedonia’s independence from the former 
Yugoslavia and imposed a trade embargo on the small, landlocked country 
in 1994. This, combined with economic sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia 
during the civil war in Bosnia, produced seriously deleterious effects for its 
economy. The civil war in Bosnia also foreshadowed possible ethnic conflict 
within Macedonia’s own borders. The collapse of the Albanian government 
after the implosion of a giant Ponzi scheme only exacerbated concerns that 
ethnic tensions between the Macedonian and Albanian communities would 
2. Christopher Chivvis, “The Making of Macedonia,” Survival 50, no. 2 (2008): 141 – 62.
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worsen if there were a large influx of refugees. The outbreak of war in Kosovo 
in 1999 would be the first conflict to directly involve and threaten the secu-
rity of the FYROM state.
Instability in the Balkans was the prime motivation for NATO involvement 
in the region. Troops from NATO member states — Norway and the United 
States — were stationed in Macedonia as early as 1992 as part of the United 
Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) to monitor the security 
situation between it, Albania, and the former Yugoslavia. Additional NATO 
troops were stationed shortly before war broke out in 1998 to support logisti-
cal operations and aid in the humanitarian mission. In 2001, when the Euro-
pean Union took over peacekeeping activities in Bosnia, a Macedonian troop 
contingent was sent under Operation Althea, and a small contingent remains 
to monitor the border between Kosovo and FYROM.
Efforts to stem the spread of ethnic conflict failed with the outbreak of 
violent conflict within FYROM. There is little evidence to support the claim 
that the Albanian irredentist National Liberation Army (NLA) was respon-
sible for initiating the violence. Instead, the revolt by Albania minorities can 
be attributed to the severe crackdown by ultranationalists in Skopje.3 Once 
violence escalated and the NLA seized villages outside the capital, NATO 
and EU representatives succeeded in averting a larger conflict or even a civil 
war through diplomatic negotiations, leading to the Lake Ohrid agreement 
in 2001. As a consequence, NATO troops were then deployed under Opera-
tion Essential Harvest to disarm the rebels. The NATO mission was replaced 
by EU forces, in the first mission under the European Security and Defense 
Policy, in Operation Concordia, which included the use of NATO resources. 
Since the end of Operation Concordia, all foreign troops have been removed 
from Macedonian territory with the exception of a small contingent monitor-
ing the border with Kosovo and a unit of NATO headquarters in Skopje to 
assist in implementing the country’s NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP).
Just as NATO involvement in Macedonia accelerated, the FYROM govern-
ment increased its own involvement in NATO and non-NATO missions out-
side its region. In August 2002 the parliament approved the deployment of 
soldiers to Afghanistan under the International Stabilization Force (ISAF). It 
3. Ibid.
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quickly grew from just two soldiers to an entire infantry brigade and medical 
support team, which in 2009 numbered 165 total troops. With the exception 
of Australia and New Zealand, this is the largest contribution from a non-
NATO member state. Almost all Army of the Republic of Macedonia (ARM) 
troops are stationed at the airport in Kabul and rarely take part in missions 
outside of the Kabul area, aside from medical support staff sent to the rela-
tively stable, but increasingly volatile, northern provinces of Afghanistan. 
Given that most of the conflict in Afghanistan is in its southern and eastern 
provinces, questions can be raised about how beneficial Macedonian partici-
pation really is to the ISAF mission. At the same time, because FYROM has 
few national caveats on the use of force, its army could be more useful in that 
fight compared to the forces of other NATO allies as the Obama administra-
tion revises its strategy and sends more troops to militarily engage Taliban 
and al Qaeda forces. As a result, ARM participation could increase, specifi-
cally through the use of its special army unit, the Skorpions, whose members 
are trained in counterinsurgency tactics.
Macedonia also showed its willingness to serve as a loyal ally when 
it sent troops to Iraq under Operation Enduring Freedom in June 2003, 
despite widespread opposition in most of the rest of Europe. In Iraq, Mace-
donia deployed two platoons of soldiers. One included an infantry security 
platoon attached to the US 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery Regiment. It 
was responsible for manning gates and entry points at Combined Operat-
ing Base Taji. A second Macedonian Ranger platoon was embedded with 
the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment “Golden Dragons” and engaged 
in combat operations with them. After completing eleven rotations of a small 
platoon, the government removed all of its troops from Iraq in 2008. The 
United States government expressed its gratitude for Macedonia’s participa-
tion when President George W. Bush called on Greece to refrain from vetoing 
FYROM’s entry into NATO at the Bucharest summit in 2008. One can be 
relatively sure that Macedonia was among the countries then secretary of 
defense Donald Rumsfeld was referring to as part of the “New Europe.” This 
New Europe consisted of countries from Central and Eastern Europe who 
consistently demonstrated a foreign policy that was more pro-American and 
supportive of unilateral action than that of the US allies in Western Europe, 
who were staunchly opposed to US intervention in Iraq, with the exception of 
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the British, Spanish, and Portuguese governments. The Skopje government 
seemed ready to join coalitions of the willing when called on to engage in 
international operations abroad, mainly to demonstrate its bona fides as a 
loyal and trustworthy ally.4 So far, its military has not suffered any casualties 
in its military operations abroad, although three civilians were taken hostage 
and killed in Iraq by Islamic militants. 
Thus, FYROM is likely to choose to continue participating in military mis-
sions outside its territory and region irrespective of the costs for its govern-
ment. It also hosts various military exercises for Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
countries. NATO allies have praised the quality of FYROM’s participation, 
yet there are difficulties integrating a military that is still being built from 
scratch and does not have the technology to operate effectively in the field. 
The small size of the military precludes its providing substantial assistance 
to ISAF. Without a navy, FYROM cannot assist in combating piracy around 
the Horn of Africa. FYROM does possess a few attack helicopters that can 
assist in counterinsurgency operations, but there are also serious gaps in its 
military’s ability to integrate itself into NATO’s advanced communications 
and logistical infrastructure. While helpful to the missions in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Macedonia’s assistance is only a tiny amount compared to the 
demands of the security tasks at hand.
FYROM participation so far with NATO shows that its membership is only 
marginally beneficial. Stability in the Balkans, provided by both NATO and 
Macedonian forces, is certainly in the interest of both sides. NATO interven-
tion in the Balkans helped keep ethnic conflict from spreading across the 
entire southern Balkans, engulfing Albania, Greece, and even Bulgaria and 
Romania. Aggressive diplomacy by both EU and NATO officials certainly 
averted a civil war in Macedonia. NATO also gains a reliable ally in terms of 
its contribution to future missions, irrespective of the limited capabilities of 
its military.
However, NATO involvement in the southern Balkans has not alleviated or 
solved key sources of conflict in the region. Despite pressure from the United 
States and other NATO members, Greece has not changed its position on 
4. FYROM’s participation in overseas missions also included one officer as part of UNIFIL in 
Lebanon.
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its name dispute with FYROM. This is only one example of how integration 
into institutional organizations does not always ameliorate ongoing disputes 
within or between states when they join.5 The future of Kosovo, which voted 
for independence in 2008, could still have unintended effects for the rest of 
this turbulent region in terms of strengthening separatist movements in other 
states, including FYROM, Bosnia, and the rest of the former Yugoslavia, 
plunging the region back into open conflict.6 Western European countries 
could experience renewed streams of refugees from the region while they are 
developing new policies to accommodate current immigrants and limit future 
ones. Given that NATO resources are stretched thin already and its atten-
tion is focused on the conflict in Afghanistan and other issues, it is unlikely 
that NATO officials will either have the time or energy to devote themselves 
to these issues if they arise. Furthermore, conflict in the region would only 
exacerbate the difficulties NATO has in creating consensus on strategies to 
address current and future conflicts outside NATO territory. There is also 
historical evidence to support the hypothesis that military alliances can actu-
ally engulf larger member states and lead them into conflicts that are not in 
their direct national interest, both inside and outside the alliance. In some 
cases, including countries that are already at odds with each other in an alli-
ance can threaten its cohesion, especially when it is a peacetime alliance.7 
Inclusion of FYROM into NATO does not necessarily prevent other allies 
within the alliance, such as Greece, Albania, or other Balkan countries, from 
waging war on each other.8
Realistically, the only gains for NATO, stability and economic growth in 
the southern Balkans, are far into the future and quite minimal. The alli-
ance’s members certainly are interested in reducing tensions among the vari-
ous ethnic groups and states in the region. NATO intervention in Bosnia, 
Kosovo, and FYROM reflects a key national interest in maintaining peace 
5. EU membership for Cyprus, despite the continued division of the island between the Greek south 
and Turkish north, is another illustration. 
6. Ted Galen Carpenter, “A New Era of Turbulence in the Balkans?” Mediterranean Quarterly 19, 
no. 3 (2008): 6 – 22.
7. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981); Patricia 
A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2004).
8. Jeremy Pressman, Warring Friends (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).
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in this volatile region. However, unless NATO devotes far more diplomatic 
and economic resources to the region, there is a high risk that violence could 
flare up once again. In addition, if NATO membership strengthens democ-
racy and these countries’ newly created capitalist markets, then both the rest 
of Europe and the Balkans would benefit from increased trade and larger 
markets for each other’s goods and services. But these gains pale in compari-
son to current costs of welcoming these new, poorer members into the alli-
ance. Foreign aid has come in the form of direct financial assistance as well 
as advice to make military reforms. NATO assists Macedonia in restructuring 
its military as the government receives multiple grants to improve its crisis 
management systems and counterterrorism activities. Most foreign aid comes 
from the United States and totaled more than $400 million between 1990 
and 2008 through the Support for East European Democracy Act. US Aid for 
International Development operations include small infrastructure projects 
and efforts to reduce corruption and enhance the rule of law. These funds 
are certainly a tiny sliver of the total US foreign aid budget. But if the United 
States or other NATO countries were to be credibly committed to developing 
Macedonia, millions of dollars more would be required.
The Costs and Benefits for FYROM
Given the comparative costs NATO bears bringing FYROM into the alli-
ance’s fold versus the relatively few benefits of doing so, the next question 
that requires answering is whether the benefits for FYROM itself are likely to 
occur at all. The most generous evaluation of Macedonia’s progress in terms 
of democratic and economic transition shows that it made significant steps 
in securing democracy, reforming its economy, and, most important, trans-
forming its military to meet NATO standards. However, much more progress 
is necessary. Some events show that the government in Skopje even moved 
backward in some respects. Finally, it is doubtful that NATO membership 
can produce real change in Macedonia, especially compared to other mea-
sures such as EU accession or, simply, direct diplomatic pressure. 
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The Marginal Effects on Democratization
Securing a working democracy in FYROM clearly starts with settling and 
ameliorating ethnic tensions between the Slavic and Albanian communities. 
The Lake Ohrid agreement of 2001 set the framework for inclusion of the 
Albanian minority in political affairs and addressing existing social inequal-
ities. The newly drafted constitution now requires a double majority for cer-
tain legislative proposals, effectively providing Albanian ethnic parties with 
a veto over proposed legislation, but also slowing down the reform process. 
Albanian is also now recognized as an official language. More steps are being 
taken to include ethnic minorities within the public administration as well as 
in the military. Elections, however, still do not run smoothly. After the Greek 
veto on FYROM membership in NATO, snap elections were called in March 
2008. Numerous incidents of violence and voter fraud followed, primarily in 
the Albanian-minority regions of the country. While the government in Sko-
pje has made significant steps in implementing the Ohrid agreement, passing 
numerous pieces of legislation is not enough. Enforcement of the provisions 
and real change on the ground is still necessary.
One of the key conditions for FYROM membership in NATO is the trans-
formation of civil-military relations. Beginning with the PfP programs, the 
MAP and Strategic Defense Review each contributed to the reform of the 
FYROM military. First, its size was reduced from sixteen thousand in 2002 
to less than eight thousand in 2009, of which approximately six hundred are 
civilians in the Ministry of Defense (MoD). The MoD still strives for repre-
sentation of the Albanian minority to reach 25 percent of its total staff. The 
ARM has quickly moved away from a conscript-based force to one consisting 
mainly of professionals and with a relatively rigorous training program and 
postgraduate education. As a result, the ARM is becoming a military force 
that may fulfill particular niches of military combat. This includes a special 
platoon of paratroopers, known as the Falcons, and a rapid reaction force, the 
Skorpions, which can be quickly deployed for international humanitarian and 
peacekeeping missions.
The ARM’s military budget, approximately 2.3 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP), is large compared to most current NATO members. Yet it 
is unclear how much civilian control of the defense budget process exists. 
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The Macedonian National Assembly, the Sobranie, has little input in the 
final budget. The president and the prime minister prepare it in consultation 
with the ARM’s chiefs of staff. Moreover, the chain of command still remains 
unclear because of confusing lines of authority among the minister of defense, 
the president, and the prime minister, which was illustrated during the 2001 
civil conflict. It is also unclear to whom the chief of staff reports and under 
what conditions he can be dismissed. Therefore, key elements for defense 
reform, transparency and civilian control of the military, are still incomplete.
Reform of Macedonia’s security institutions does not end with its military. 
The internal use of force must also be democratically controlled and follow 
the rule of law. Yet regular abuse of human rights, specifically of the ethnic 
Albanian minority, by the police force is still widely reported.9 In response, 
the police academy was shut down in 2001 and replaced with a new police 
school in cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, the US International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Pro-
gram, and the Council of Europe.
But FYROM’s zeal to join NATO has also led to some disturbing situations 
that show that it sometimes favors unrestrained alliance cooperation over the 
protection of human rights. In March 2002, a police patrol shot to death 
seven Pakistanis as they were being arrested in the suburbs of Skopje, accus-
ing them of being “foreign militants” and planning attacks on vital installa-
tions and foreign embassies. The interior minister Ljube Boskovski claimed 
that the arrests were made to demonstrate to the United States that it was 
a loyal ally in the “war on terror.” But in 2004 an investigation discovered 
that Boskovski had fabricated the entire incident and sanctioned the execu-
tion of these unarmed illegal immigrants, who were promised easy transport 
to other parts of Europe. Boskovski was charged, put on trial in 2005, and 
subsequently acquitted. Boskovski was also later tried at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia for war crimes committed during the 2001 
conflict. Acquitted in 2007, he returned to Macedonia and started his own 
political party, United for Macedonia, in 2009, a party far to the right of the 
governing coalition led by the center-right Internal Macedonian Revolution-
9. See Suzette R. Grillot, “Policing Via Principles: Reforming the Use of Force in the Western 
Balkans,” East European Politics and Societies 22, no. 2 (2008): 319 – 46.
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ary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-
DPMNE). Support for his party is still extremely weak, but the presence of 
such a far-right nationalist figure in party politics as well as the ability to 
carry out such a heinous act while in government raises at least concerns 
about the quality of democracy and the rule of law. Far-right nationalist par-
ties are not unique to FYROM. They exist in current NATO countries as 
well. The Front National in France and Vlaams Belang in Belgium are also 
on the fringe of the national political spectrum and espouse openly racist 
party programs. My argument here is only that one should be doubtful of 
the ability of NATO to democratize its members or improve its own quality, 
whether among new or old members.
In another case of human rights abuse, Khaled el-Masri, a German citi-
zen of Lebanese descent, recently filed a lawsuit against the government 
in Skopje for violating the European Convention on Human Rights. At the 
end of 2003, in a case of misidentification, the Central Intelligence Agency 
requested that Macedonian police in Skopje to detain el-Masri under suspi-
cion that he was a high-ranking member of el Qaeda. CIA agents then flew 
to Skopje, interrogated him, and tortured him for twenty-four days. Later, he 
was sent to Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan under the CIA’s program 
of extraordinary rendition in early 2003 but released in May 2004.
FYROM’s NATO candidacy continues despite shortcomings in the rule 
of law. This confirms the claim that the degree to which a country has effec-
tive operating democratic institutions has never been a qualification for 
membership. During the Cold War, Greece, Turkey, and Portugal were all 
autocratic regimes or suffered democratic breakdown while NATO members. 
Like FYROM, all other new members from Central Europe were committed 
to democratization before entering.10 There is some evidence that the car-
rots and sticks associated with NATO membership talks accelerated changes 
in civilian-military relations.11 Whether effective democratic institutions is 
even a necessary condition for membership is further questioned by NATO’s 
10. Dan Reiter, “Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy,” International Security 
25, no. 4 (2001): 41 – 67.
11. Timothy Edmunds, “NATO and Its New Members,” Survival 45, no. 3 (2003): 145 – 66; Marian 
Zulean, “Changing Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in Southeastern Europe,” Mediterranean 
Quarterly 15, no. 2 (2004): 58 – 82.
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interest in having Ukraine and the Republic of Georgia join, although not in 
the near term. Among NATO’s new members, democracy is still fragile in 
Albania, and Croatia is not fully cooperating with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia. Thus, the evidence so far strongly indicates that a 
candidate country’s stage or quality of democracy does not affect the prob-
ability of future NATO membership. Therefore, a key benefit for NATO, a 
stable democracy in the southern Balkans, is still not yet fully realized. More-
over, it is unlikely that NATO membership has a significant effect in pushing 
FYROM further along these lines. Finally, if the breaches in human rights 
protections occur because the government hopes to demonstrate its credibil-
ity as an alliance partner, then further caution with Macedonia’s application 
might be in order.
The Marginal Effects on the Economy
The democratization effects of NATO expansion on FYROM are question-
able. What of the economic benefits for FYROM? In the long term, the 
Macedonian government believes that NATO membership signals to foreign 
investors that the security situation is stable and there are effective free mar-
ket institutions. But continued stagnant economic growth and other problems 
raise doubts about whether significant foreign investment will take place, 
even if FYROM joins NATO. Since 2001, Macedonia has experienced sta-
ble economic growth, an average 3.2 percent annual increase in GDP, but it 
lags behind all of its peers in the region. Foreign investment climbed to 4.2 
percent of GDP in 2008, below the regional average of 6.2 percent. As its 
trade and current account deficit climb to 30 percent and 15 percent of GDP, 
respectively, the country’s unemployment rate stubbornly remains at approxi-
mately 35 percent.12
The government remains committed to a fiscal austerity program to lower 
the budget deficit over the short term. Most of the budget cuts will affect 
social security contributions and payments and are not in the defense sector. 
It is hoped that reducing labor costs will stimulate further foreign invest-
12. International Monetary Fund, “IMF Country Report: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: 
Selected Issues” (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2009).
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ment. However, other factors that shape the Macedonian business environ-
ment still discourage such investment. Its telecommunications and electricity 
infrastructure desperately needs improvement, and its customs procedures 
are notoriously complicated, corrupt, and inefficient.13 Finally, the protection 
of private property is weak, and FYROM continues to have comparatively 
high levels of corruption. It ranks 84th out of 179 countries in Transparency 
International’s Corruption Index. Among the World Bank’s six indicators of 
good governance, FYROM does not rank higher than the 60th percentile.14 
It is unlikely that NATO membership will have a significant impact on 
FYROM’s macroeconomic situation or the functioning of its market institu-
tions. It does signal that a new member meets some basic levels of democracy 
and has a semifunctioning free market economy. The active involvement of 
NATO and European officials could hinder the further explosions of ethnic 
conflict. Yet there is little reason to suspect that membership will have any-
thing but a marginal effect on the decision of a foreign investor to invest in 
Macedonia.
Not only are there questionable economic benefits, there is also the likeli-
hood of increased security threats for Macedonia itself. These threats may 
include the spread of radical Islam. According to Christopher Deliso, numer-
ous Islamic fundamentalists from Pakistan and members of the Wahhabi sect 
of Islam have entered FYROM, settled in villages in the southern and east-
ern parts of the country, and began converting the local Muslim population 
to their ultraconservative version of Islam.15 Members of Tablighi Jamaat, a 
Pakistani missionary and charity organization with suspected ties to terrorist 
networks, are interfering in the governance of established Muslim organi-
zations in Skopje and elsewhere in Macedonia. Deliso argues that Islamic 
fundamentalists see a generally illiterate, marginalized, and significantly 
large Muslim community ripe for radicalization. He makes a — somewhat 
exaggerated — case for the radicalization of the Muslim communities not 
13. World Bank, “Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia: Trade Brief” (Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 2008).
14. World Bank, “Country Data Report for Macedonia, 1996 – 2008” (Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 2009).
15. Christopher Deliso, The Coming Balkan Caliphate (Westport, CT: Praeger Security Interna-
tional, 2007).
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only in Macedonia but also across the Balkans. The secular nature of the 
Muslim communities, the fact that political mobilization is along ethnic and 
not religious lines, and the acceptance of NATO’s presence means the spread 
of fundamentalist Islam is not likely to occur.16 Instead, the threat of a terror-
ist attack by Muslim extremists is more likely to come from outside. FYROM 
could be targeted because of its participation in the Iraq and Afghan con-
flicts. This is not to imply that it should refrain from participation in interna-
tional missions because of an increased terrorist threat. Instead, the govern-
ment should take into account the unintended consequences of participation 
in NATO missions and take the necessary measures to secure its population 
from an attack or prepare for one without violating the rule of law or conven-
tions on human rights.
Public Opinion
Despite the many costs and marginal benefits of NATO membership, little 
domestic opposition has surfaced in Macedonia. Approximately 85 per-
cent of the population still supports NATO membership, and this support 
cuts across ethnic lines. Along with the government, the general population 
believes that NATO membership lays down the foundations for long-term 
stability and economic prosperity. More important, NATO membership sig-
nifies to them that they have joined or rejoined Europe. As for most other 
new, post – Cold War members of NATO, these countries strongly desire to 
be identified with Europe rather than with the “East.” They feel that their 
separation from Europe was “artificial” and imposed upon them by foreign 
autocracies. Therefore, whatever opposition exists to FYROM’s application 
or obstacles to progress lies mainly with the government’s general inertia and 
incapacity to make the necessary changes swiftly in a political culture still 
steeped in postsocialist tradition, rather than any unwillingness to join the 
alliance.
Among NATO countries, opposition to FYROM’s membership has not 
16. Gordon N. Bardos, “Balkan Blowback? Osama bin Laden and Southeastern Europe,” Mediter-
ranean Quarterly 13, no. 1 (2002): 44 – 53.
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emerged, except for that of Greece. In contrast to the EU, there appears little 
enlargement exhaustion. Admission of the Baltic states and other Central 
and Eastern European countries took place in 2004 and was followed by the 
admission of Albania and Croatia in early 2009. The relatively scant atten-
tion their admission received by the media or among European governments 
demonstrates how unimportant their inclusion in the alliance proved to be. In 
addition, NATO has extended formal invitations to Ukraine and the Republic 
of Georgia, but recent conflicts in the region and the poor relations these 
countries have with Russia certainly will delay their entry. Yet over the long 
term, negotiations will continue with these countries despite even more seri-
ous concerns about the quality of their democracies and the strength of their 
market economies. In the meantime, no serious objections to the expansion of 
the alliance have developed as it faces one of it most serious tests: bringing 
peace and stability to Afghanistan. 
Conclusion
Enlargement of NATO continues almost without objection. If Greece had 
not exercised its veto, FYROM would be a member of the alliance already. 
Yet little discussion has taken place to assess what the costs and benefits of 
Macedonia’s inclusion would be, either for itself or for the alliance. Instead, 
national governments proceed on an unaltered and almost unstoppable course 
toward increasing the size of NATO. It proceeds without a thorough analysis 
of what the impact will be for the alliance or the new member state. First, the 
inclusion of Macedonia will not substantially affect the probability that NATO 
will achieve mission success, either in Afghanistan or elsewhere. Second, 
the benefits for NATO and for Macedonia, in terms of securing democracy, 
maintaining stability in the region, and increasing foreign investment, are 
unlikely to occur, especially compared to membership in other international 
institutions, such as the EU. NATO entry could be seen as step toward EU 
entry, but they are two distinct institutions with entirely different purposes. 
The qualifications for NATO membership are separate from those related to 
joining the EU. Third, Macedonian entry could actually put NATO in greater 
risk, in terms of involving it in additional conflicts, at a time it can ill afford 
60  Mediterranean Quarterly: Winter 2010 Siegel: Weighing Macedonia’s Entry into NATO  60
to be so. Despite these concerns, FYROM still seems likely to join NATO 
in the next few years, given strong support within the country and the alli-
ance. If so, more attention is needed to monitor the possible threats that its 
entry could create and consider strengthening the mechanisms NATO uses to 
secure democracy in member candidates, especially before it moves further 
eastward to include even more problematic country cases.
